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In the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court has been taking
legal realism a bit too seriously. “We were all brought up on
sophisticated talk about the fluidity of the line between substance
and procedure,”1 but for many years, when presented with a
problem of vertical choice of law, the Supreme Court hemmed
and hawed about the subtleness of the distinction—and picked
one. Ultimately, a decision had to be made; either the federal
courts would follow a particular state law in diversity cases or
they would not.
In the First Phase of Erie,2 state law was ascendant and almost
always deemed binding.3 In the second phase, after Hanna v.
Plumer,4 the Federal Rules reigned supreme, sweeping aside any
state law in or near their path.5 In both phases, the Supreme Court’s
decisions sometimes strained credulity. They did, however, perform
the function of answering the question “Does this state law govern in
federal court?” with a “yes” or a “no.” Beginning with Gasperini v.
Center for Humanities,6 however, a shifting coalition of justices has
pursued a third path, neither declaring state law applicable nor
declaring it inapplicable. Instead, they have claimed for themselves
the prerogative to fashion law that purportedly accommodates the
interests of both sovereigns.7 With the cover of an intellectual
critique of the substance-procedure dichotomy, the Court has thus
embarked on a Third Phase of the Erie doctrine, a phase that replaces
“yes” or “no” with “Let’s see what we can work out.”
This new venture—so far, Gasperini, Semtek v. Lockheed,8 and,
most recently, a plurality of the Court in Shady Grove v. Allstate9—
1

John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724
(1974).
2
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3
See infra, Part I.A.
4
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
5
See infra, Part I.B.
6
518 U.S. 415 (1996).
7
See infra, Part I.C.
8
Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
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has been the object of “a chorus of academic criticism.”10 Most of
this criticism focuses on problems of administrability, lack of
adequate guidance to lower courts, and the continuing absurdity of
reading a Federal Rule to mean one thing in federal cases and
another in diversity.11
This Article adds a new level of critique. It argues that Phase
Three and its rejection of the substance—procedure dichotomy are
ultra vires and are based on a misguided aspiration to accommodate
state substantive policies at the expense of federal procedure. This
thesis requires me to defend both a descriptive and a prescriptive
claim. Descriptively, in order to have a dichotomy, it is necessary to
have two poles. I therefore demonstrate that the distinction between
substance and procedure is appropriately represented by a singledimensional spectrum. That is, even though there are several
different ways of making the distinction—the Rules of Decision Act
(“RDA”) approach,12 the Rules Enabling Act (“REA”) approach,13
the inherent powers approach14—the tests for each of these
approaches can be understood as marking different points along the
same linear continuum. With pure substance at one end and pure
procedure at the other, all legal rules can be thought of as lying at
some point between these two poles. Part of what the Court has done
wrong is to ignore this linear relationships by insisting, for example,
in Semtek, that res judicata is “too substantive” to be addressed in
the Federal Rules yet procedural enough to be governed by federal
common law under the RDA.15

9

Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Insur. Co., _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 1431
(2010).
10
Earl C. Dudley & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules: An Essay
On What’s Wrong With the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 708
(2006).
11
See infra, part II.A.
12
Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
13
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
14
See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813 (2008)
(describing and developing a theory for explaining the federal courts’ inherent
powers over procedure).
15
See infra part II.B.1.
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My second task is to defend the dichotomy. Given the linearity
of substance and procedure, one could imagine the distinction either
as a dichotomy of black and white, with every legal rule falling into
one category or the other, or as a spectrum of gray, with many or
even most legal rules falling in the mushy middle. Descriptively, of
course, the latter view is more accurate. My claim, however, is that
the Court should, with full awareness of the grayness of all things,
nevertheless classify each one as black or white, rather than attempt
to accommodate both its procedural and its substantive aspects.
This Article offers two reasons for preferring the black—white
approach. First, the governing statutes contemplate a dichotomy
between substance and procedure, and the Court is not authorized to
use the ambiguity in that distinction to replace the statutory scheme
with its own discretionary treatment of state law. Second, ending
Phase Three and returning to the black-white approach would
promote democratic transparency in the states. Specifically, in
addition to traditional Erie concerns about judicial lawmaking,
Congress has set a policy of establishing a uniform body of transsubstantive procedural law. State lawmakers know this, and there is
nothing wrong with federal courts expecting them to act accordingly.
If they, as Representative Dingell famously offered,16 prefer to
manipulate procedure in order to undermine the substantive rights
they purport to have created, the threat of fixed procedures in
diversity could and should restrain them. Too often, the Supreme
Court treats legislative enactments as fixed, so that the game begins
when the litigants start their forum shopping. The game begins
earlier, in the legislature, and the Court’s ad hoc, accommodating
approach to state law in Erie’s third phase creates the wrong
incentives for that game.
Part I of this Article describes Erie’s three phases and identifies
a key characteristic of each phase’s treatment of the relationship
16

“I’ll let you write the substance ... you let me write the procedure, and I’ll screw
you every time.” Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327 Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Regulations of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. John Dingell).
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between state law and the Federal Rules. For those readers fortunate
enough to have escaped law school before the Third Phase, part I.C
describes its leading cases—Gasperini, Semtek, and Shady Grove—
in detail. It shows that while the First Phase was characterized by
deference to state policy and the Second Phase by the ascendency of
the Federal Rules, the Third Phase is characterized by Supreme
Court discretion in formulating the law that controls in diversity
cases. Part II.A argues that the Court lacks authority for exercising
this discretion: the Phase Three Court perceives itself as a creative
problem-solver that crafts accommodations to serve state and federal
interests, while its proper role in this context is much more limited.
Part II.B argues that the Phase Three approach also undermines
separation of powers principles at the state level. The Supreme Court
has justified its Phase Three approach by the purported need to
vindicate state policy choices. However, state-level democracy
would be better served by forcing state lawmakers to enact their
policy choices in substantive law, rather than allowing them to
manipulate outcomes through procedure. One way to make them do
so is to adhere to a uniform system of federal procedure, rather than
modifying procedure on an ad hoc basis as the Court has done in
Phase Three. Part III offers suggestions for minimizing the damage:
confining the Phase Three cases to their facts and returning to the
conceptual structure of Phase Two.
I. THE THREE PHASES OF ERIE
Vertical choice of law doctrine has developed in three stages
since Erie was decided. In Phase One, the Supreme Court held that
almost every state law it encountered was “substantive” for purposes
of the RDA.17 In Phase Two, the Court reversed course, holding that
almost everything was not only procedural but also already covered
by the Federal Rules.18 The Federal Rules fared poorly in Phase One,
while state law fared poorly in Phase Two. In both of these phases,
however, the Court honored the need to choose: state law either did
or did not apply.
17
18

See infra, Part I.A.
See infra, Part I.B.
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In Phase Three, the Supreme Court struck out in a new
direction.19 The new approach, which began in Gasperini, starts with
the observation that substance and procedure are inextricably
intertwined.20 A law that on its face regulates procedure may be
intended to serve a substantive policy. In Phases One and Two, this
reality meant that the decision whether to apply state law was often
difficult. In Phase Three, the Court has taken the initiative to craft
compromises that accommodate state policy while retaining federal
control. The Third Phase is thus characterized by the federal
Supreme Court exercising discretionary authority over whether and
how to accommodate what it perceives to be state policy preferences
expressed in state procedural law.
A. Phase One: Extreme Deference to the States
The Supreme Court held in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins21 that the
Rules of Decision Act requires a federal court sitting in diversity22 to
apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits.23 In the
standard telling of the story, the reasons for the decision were both
jurisprudential and political. Jurisprudentially, legal realism and
positivism had swept aside belief in a single, universal common law
that could be discovered by state and federal courts alike.24
19

See infra, Part I.C.
See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996).
21
State substantive law may apply in federal court for reasons other than diversity
jurisdiction, such as when state law claim is litigated under the supplemental
jurisdiction granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1367. For the sake of convenience, this Article
follows the common practice of referring to Erie questions as arising primarily in
diversity cases.
22
State substantive law may apply in federal court for reasons other than diversity
jurisdiction, such as when a state law claim is litigated under the supplemental
jurisdiction granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1367. For the sake of convenience, this Article
follows the common practice of referring to Erie questions as arising primarily in
diversity cases.
23
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). More precisely, Erie held that
federal courts must follow state law “rules of decision,” a requirement that in
retrospect has been understood as drawing a distinction that maps, at least
approximately, onto the concepts of “substance” and “procedure.” See id.
24
See Edward A. Purcell, The Story of Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges,
Politics, and Social Change Reshape Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES at 23-24
20
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Politically, the old guard in the federal courts was adhering to
common law doctrines—especially doctrines that hindered tort
plaintiffs—that in state courts were giving way to the demands of
new social realities in the wake of the industrial revolution.25 The
Erie doctrine restricted the power of the federal diversity courts over
substantive law, confining them to the task of providing an
alternative forum for enforcing legal rights that are created and
defined by the states.26
The Erie dissenters were the first to anticipate what would
become the central meaning of Erie to future generations: the
distinction between substance and procedure. They observed, “The
line between procedural and substantive law is hazy but no one
doubts federal power over procedure.”27 Consistent with this point,
Erie’s First Phase was devoted primarily to developing a menu of
tests for distinguishing substance from procedure under the RDA.28
(Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004) (describing the pre-Erie “declaratory” theory of
law); HOWARD FINK & MARK TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND
PRACTICE 190 (2d ed. 1987).
25
See Purcell, supra note 24, at 25 (“[Before Erie], the federal courts were
becoming identified with the new national economy and the protection of corporate
rights, and their ‘general’ law decisions spread from commercial issues into most
common-law fields and seemed to grow ever more favorable to corporate
interests.”); JoEllen Lind, “Procedural Swift”: Complex Litigation Reform, State
Tort Law, and Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717, 732 (2004) (“According
to some commentators, Swift [v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1941),] secured the federal
courts as ‘business courts’ used by corporations to resist the claims of workers
seeking redress for injuries.”); Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine?
(And What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?),
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 248 (2008) (“Justice Brandeis’ ruling in Erie
restrained a pro-corporate federal judiciary by eliminating its power to create
substantive rules of federal common law, which had operated to displace state rules
that were often less favorable to corporate litigants.”).
26
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (“There is no federal general common law.”).
27
Erie, 304 U.S. at 91-92 (Reed, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
28
The Court at times refused to describe the distinction as one between substance
and procedure, perhaps wishing to retain those terms for marking the bounds of the
REA. See Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“It is … immaterial
whether statutes of limitations are characterized either as ‘substantive’ or
‘procedural’ in State court opinions in any use of those terms unrelated to the
specific issue before us.”). This Article refers to both the REA and the RDA—and,
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When a litigant proposes that a particular state law should govern in
a diversity action, federal courts ask whether the matter is outcomedeterminative in a run of cases, so as to implicate the “twin aims” of
Erie: to avoid inequitable outcomes and to discourage forum
shopping.29 If so, then state law should apply.30 Depending on the
circumstances, courts may also balance Erie concerns against other
federal interests that may favor the application of federal law.31
Although the Erie dissenters’ comment could be read as
implicitly insisting that the brand-new Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure not be disregarded in diversity cases, the majority seemed
to have a different idea. For the next three decades, the Court bent
over backwards to apply state law, holding that state law governed
even such plausibly procedural matters as statutes of limitations,
enforcement of arbitration clauses, and bond requirements.32 For
example, the Court showed great deference to the states in Ragan v.
for that matter, the powers of Congress and the courts to regulate judicial
proceedings—as distinguishing between “substance” and “procedure,” while
recognizing that the dividing line is in a different place under each regime. I will
usually refer to matters as being either substantive or procedural “for purposes of
the REA [or the RDA, or inherent powers, or whatever].” For readers who prefer a
more prominent reminder that these labels are conclusory rather than inherent in
the matters discussed, I suggest globally replacing “substance” and “procedure”
with more clearly arbitrary terms, such as “Salt” and “Pepper.”
29
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-67 (1965).
30
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470.
31
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958). Byrd was the
only major case that refused to follow state law in Phase One, concluding that
federal practice, rather than state, determined the division of responsibility between
judge and jury in federal court. Although the Court did not reach the question
whether the Seventh Amendment required this outcome, the Court made plain that
it reasoned in the shadow of the Seventh Amendment by introducing the concept of
“countervailing federal interests” into the Erie analysis. Confronted with a
potential constitutional command, the Court at last remembered that federal law is
supreme; in this sense, Byrd can be seen as a forerunner of the Second Phase. See
Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537-539.
32
See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (length of statute of
limitations); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949)
(what action is needed to toll statute of limitations by initiating litigation); Cohen
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (bond requirement);
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Amer., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (arbitration).
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Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Company.33 The question in
Ragan was whether the plaintiff had satisfied the statute of
limitations by filing the complaint in federal court.34 According to
Federal Rule 3, an action is “commenced” as soon as it is filed,
which would seem to indicate that any limitations period stops
running.35 State law, however, maintained that an action was not
“commenced” until the summons and complaint had been served.36
Anxious to defer to state law, the Supreme Court implausibly read
Rule 3 as pertaining only to the federal courts’ internal
administrative processes.37 In non-diversity cases, however, Rule 3
continued to be understood as defining commencement for
limitations purposes.38 In diversity cases it meant something
different. The characteristic feature of this First Phase was the
Court’s finding that almost all law was “substantive” and thus
controlled by the states, even to the point of adopting a dual
interpretation of a single Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.39
B. Phase Two: The Imperial Rules
By apt coincidence, Erie was decided in 1938, the same year the
Supreme Court first promulgated uniform, trans-substantive Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for use in federal courts, pursuant to the
Rules Enabling Act of 1934.40 Alongside the developing Erie
33

337 U.S. 530 (1949).
Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531.
35
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 3.
36
Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531 (describing state law).
37
Ragan, 337 U.S. at 533.
38
West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987) (“[W]e now hold that when the
underlying cause of action is based on federal law and the absence of an express
federal statute of limitations makes it necessary to borrow a limitations period from
another statute, the action is not barred if it has been ‘commenced’ in compliance
with Rule 3 within the borrowed period.”).
39
The dual-interpretation problem can be elided by treating the “federal” version
of each Federal Rule as a judicial gloss akin to common lawmaking. If that gloss is
“substantive” for RDA purposes, it must give way to a “state” version of the
Federal Rule in diversity cases. However, this is not how the Supreme Court has
framed its analysis in the dual-interpretation cases. See comment by Adam
Steinman on civil procedure professors’ listserv, 4/3/10 (on file with author).
40
28 U.S.C. § 2072; Pub. L. No. 73-415, ch. 651, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
34
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doctrine distinguishing substance from procedure under the RDA, a
separate line of cases addressed the validity of particular Federal
Rules, under the mandate of the REA that the Rules govern
“procedure” and do not “modify or abridge substantive rights.”41 The
REA cases adopted a much broader understanding of the procedure
category: to this day, anything that “really regulates procedure” is
valid territory for the Federal Rules.42
The REA line of cases collided with Erie and the RDA in
Hanna v. Plumer,43 which marks the beginning of Erie’s Second
Phase. Hanna recognized that if valid, controlling federal law
dictated a result, that law superseded any state law, under the
Supremacy Clause as well as under the language of the RDA.44
Hanna further pointed out that the Federal Rules are federal laws.
They thus control whenever they validly apply.45
In Hanna, this issue played out on the question of service of
process. State law required personal service on the defendant, while
Federal Rule 4 offered options for substituted service.46 Under cases
like Ragan, the defendant had a plausible argument that the mode of
service constituted substantive state policy to which the federal court
should defer.47 Rule 4, however, is certainly valid under the “really
41

28 U.S.C. 2072; Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1941) (stating the
“really regulates procedure” test).
42
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Insur. Co., _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct.
1431, 1444 (2010) (affirming that “really regulates procedure” remains the test
under the REA).
43
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
44
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472.
45
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473-74 (“To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights
would be to disembowel either the Constitution’s grant of power over federal
procedure or Congress’ attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act.”).
46
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463 (describing the differences between state and federal
requirements).
47
See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949)
(holding that state law determines when an action has “commenced,” for purposes
of tolling the statute of limitations). Because state law determines whether service
is required to toll the statute of limitations, it makes sense that state law would
determine how service must be performed.
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regulates procedure” standard of the REA.48 It is therefore a valid
federal law that speaks directly to the question, and it trumps state
law.49
After Hanna, the Court once again swung to the extreme, this
time aggressively reading federal law to displace state law. The
zenith of this Phase is illustrated by a pair of Alabama cases. In one,
the plaintiff argued that a federal court sitting in diversity should
follow Alabama courts in refusing to enforce forum-selection
clauses.50 Such clauses were against public policy in Alabama.51
Although no federal law requires that forum-selection clauses be
enforced, the Supreme Court held that the general change-of-venue
statutes covered the territory and therefore superseded Alabama
law.52 The other Alabama case dealt with a state statute requiring
defendants to pay penalties for unsuccessful appeals.53 Again, no
federal law appeared directly on point. The Court, however, looked
to general provisions in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
that deal with taxation of costs on appeal.54 In the Phase-Two
enthusiasm for Federal Rules over state law, these provisions were
close enough to the general topic of penalizing unsuccessful appeals
to justify disregarding the state law.55 The Second Phase, then, is
characterized by the Court’s aggressive use of federal procedural law
to avoid any obligation to advance state policies.
After Hanna, it was also clear that there were two separate
standards for distinguishing substance from procedure. In what
Hanna called “unguided Erie” analysis,56 courts distinguish between
substance and procedure by using the twin aims of Erie in
combination with earlier precedents such as Guaranty Trust and
48

See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464.
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464.
50
Burlington N. R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 (1987).
51
Burlington, 480 U.S. at 8.
52
Burlington, 480 U.S. at 8.
53
Stewart Org. v. Ricoh, 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
54
Stewart, 487 U.S. at 27.
55
Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28.
56
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
49
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Byrd, which ask whether the rule is outcome-determinative, whether
it is bound up with substantive rights, and whether there are
countervailing federal interests.57 On the spectrum from substance to
procedure, these tests mark the dividing line somewhere in the midst
of an admittedly very large gray area:

substance

Erie/RDA test

procedure58

In contrast, when the analysis is “guided” by the existence of a
Federal Rule on point, the Court is much more strongly inclined to
find that the matter is procedural. That is, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure get the benefit of the doubt that they really are procedural.
Thus, the REA line is much closer to the “substance” end of the
spectrum, while the RDA line is closer to the “procedure” end:

substance

REA test

Erie/RDA test

procedure

A state law that would be deemed “substantive” under unguided Erie
analysis might still be superseded by a Federal Rule.
57

See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (outcomedetermination test); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535
(1958) (Byrd balancing test).
58
Note that none of the diagrams that follow is necessarily to scale. The arrows
mark relative positions on the substance-procedure line but are not intended to
suggest claims about the relative size of each segment of the line.
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For example, in Ragan, the Court concluded that the state’s rule
for when an action is “commenced” for statute of limitations
purposes is substantive under Erie.59 This conclusion followed
naturally from Guaranty Trust, which held that statutes of limitations
were themselves substantive.60 The federal court in Ragan was
therefore obliged to follow state practice and hold that a diversity
action had not been commenced until the summons had been served.
After Hanna, this case might have come out the other way. Rather
than apply Erie’s substance/procedure test, the Court could have
applied the REA test to Rule 3, which says that an action is
“commenced” when the complaint is filed. If the Rule passed the
REA’s “really regulates procedure” test, it would control even in
diversity cases and there would be no need for an unguided Erie
analysis.61
In the first two phases of Erie, the Court swung between two
poles, first favoring state law, then federal. What emerged, however,
was a reasonably clear framework of federal supremacy tempered by
the federalism of the RDA—or at least, it was reasonably clear after
John Hart Ely explained it.62 In addition, the first two phases shared
one overriding feature: in every case, the federal courts were told
either to follow their normal federal practices, even in diversity
59

Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949).
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945).
61
Guaranty Trust, Ragan, and Hanna all deal with rules that affect a statute of
limitations. While it makes some sense for them all to come out the same way,
there has to be a dividing line somewhere in the gradual transition between
substance and procedure. Moreover, any discrepancy between Guaranty Trust and
reverse-Ragan is ameliorated by considering the purpose that “commencement” of
the action serves. The state law in Ragan required service before the end of the
limitations period, presumably so the defendant would receive notice within that
period. This approach is compatible with the fact that many state courts will allow
a complaint to languish for years without being served before it will be dismissed
for failure to prosecute. In federal court, however, service is generally required
within 120 days of filing, which would ameliorate the concerns that presumably
motivated the state law in Ragan. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 4(m). Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed Ragan after Hanna. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,
446 U.S. 740 (1980). Having already lived with the dual interpretation of Rule 3
for three decades, the court chose not to overrule Ragan.
62
See Ely, supra note 1.

60
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cases, or to apply a particular rule of state law. In each case, the
choice between these two options and the content of the rule to be
applied flowed directly from federal laws, such as the REA, or from
state laws, made binding on diversity courts by virtue of the RDA.
C. Phase Three: A Third Way to Nowhere
After swinging once to each extreme—over-zealous deference
to state law, then aggressive implementation of the Federal Rules—
one would hope that the Supreme Court would retreat to a happy
medium. Instead, however, in Gasperini and Semtek, the Court
unveiled a new approach to Erie problems in which, instead of
choosing between state and federal practice, the Court made up its
own rule that conformed to neither.63 Then in Shady Grove, the
Court splintered: Four dissenters would have continued down the
new path, while a four-justice plurality rejected it.64 The ninth,
Justice Stevens, appeared to lean toward the dissenters’ theoretical
approach but disagreed with the application and so voted with the
plurality.65
Robert Condlin has observed that Gasperini is “the type of
precedent that, in retrospect, often turns out to be either the harbinger
of a new doctrinal order, or an analytical wild card never heard from
again.”66 Only time will tell “whether Gasperini becomes an integral
part of a new Erie/Hanna overview, or is forgotten as a doctrinal
frolic and detour.”67 Two decisions later, the outcome is still unclear,
especially because Justice Stevens, now retired, was the swing vote

63

Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (discussed infra, part
I.C.1); Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) (discussed
infra, part I.C.2).
64
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Insur. Co., _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 1431
(2010) (discussed infra, Part I.C.3).
65
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
66
Robert J. Condlin, “A Formstone of Our Federalism”: The Erie/Hanna Doctrine
and Casebook Law Reform, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 525 (2005).
67
Condlin, supra note 66, at 525.
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in Shady Grove.68 This Article aims to demonstrate that we should
nonetheless hope for an end to the Third Phase. Phase Three of Erie
is characterized by creative interpretation that constitutes
inappropriate freelancing by a Court that is supposed to be making a
choice of law.
1. Gasperini v. Center for the Humanities
William Gasperini was a photographer who lent several hundred
of his transparencies to the Center for the Humanities.69 The Center
lost the negatives, and Gasperini sued for compensation. Sitting in
diversity, the federal jury awarded $450,000, and the trial judge
denied the Center’s motion to remit the verdict.70 On appeal, the
Center argued that the Second Circuit should review the
reasonableness of the verdict pursuant to a New York tort reform
statute.71 The statute directed intermediate courts of appeal to
determine whether a jury verdict “materially deviates from what
would be reasonable compensation.”72 The Center argued that this
statute reflected substantive policy in the State of New York. The
Rules of Decision Act therefore required the federal courts to follow
New York law in place of ordinary federal practice, in which
appellate review of jury verdicts is limited by historic practices under
the common law. The Second Circuit agreed and ordered that the
verdict be reduced.73
In the Supreme Court, Gasperini argued that the New York
statute conflicted with the Seventh Amendment.74 The Supreme
68

Even the Shady Grove plurality, however, joined in the Phase Three decision in
Semtek. Indeed, Justice Scalia authored both Semtek and the Shady Grove plurality
opinion.
69
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 419 (1996).
70
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 419-20.
71
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 421.
72
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 421 (quoting N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & Rules § 5501(c)).
73
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 421.
74
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426. The Gasperini dissent also argued that the New
York law was displaced by Federal Rule 59. The majority responded to this
argument in a footnote, indicating that the majority disagreed with Justice Scalia
about the scope of the Rules. For purposes of this Article, issues involving the
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Court appeared to agree, ruling that federal appellate courts cannot
apply the New York standard.75 Under prior Erie doctrine, that
would have been the end of the matter. Because there is valid federal
law on point, it preempts the state statute; federal courts obviously
cannot rely on the RDA as grounds for ignoring the Seventh
Amendment. Indeed, in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric, the mere
shadow of the Seventh Amendment was enough to push the Court to
declare the division of labor between judge and jury to be a matter of
procedure, governed by federal law even in diversity cases.76
In Gasperini, however, the Court, did not stop there. Although it
adhered to its view that federal law controlled, it changed federal law
by inventing a new procedure to accommodate what it saw as New
York’s substantive concerns. Although the Seventh Amendment
barred the Court of Appeals from reviewing the reasonableness of
the jury verdict, the Court held that the trial court could perform that
review, under the standard set by the statute.77 The result was “a
pastiche of federal and state law, but neither the one nor the other.”78
2. Semtek v. Lockheed
Semtek also involved the Court crafting a federal alternative
rather than simply choosing state law or ordinary federal practice.
Semtek is a confusing case, in part because of the knotty procedural
applicability of a Federal Rule are adequately presented by Semtek and Shady
Grove, so I follow the Court in passing lightly over that issue in Gasperini. See
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 467-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 438, n. 22 (majority
response).
75
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 439.
76
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 539 (1958) (stating that the
Court’s decision was made “under the influence—if not the command—of the
Seventh Amendment” and noting in a footnote that the Court was not deciding the
Seventh Amendment question).
77
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 436. The preceding paragraphs describe the New York
law at issue as it is described in the opening paragraph of Gasperini and as it has
generally been treated in commentary on that case. A more precise description of
New York law, and a discussion of the ramifications of that description, can be
found infra, part III.B.
78
Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 707.
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problem at its center: the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal for
failure to meet the statute of limitations.79 When a state court issues
such a dismissal, state law governs the preclusive consequences.80 In
California, where Semtek started, statute of limitations dismissals are
not preclusive, so the plaintiff remains free to re-file in a state with a
more generous limitations period.81 The extra twist was that the
dismissal in Semtek was by a federal court sitting in diversity. In
federal court, statute of limitations dismissals are usually
preclusive.82
The Supreme Court first asked whether the usual federal
practice was controlling. Lockheed argued that the case was
governed by Rule 41(b), which states:
Involuntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof. … Unless the
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a
dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not
provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party
under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.83
Before Semtek, this Rule was widely understood to instruct that all
dismissals other than those listed are claim preclusive as a matter of
federal law.84 In Semtek, however, the Court continued the
79

Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001) (“This
case presents the question whether the claim preclusive effect of a federal
judgment dismissing a diversity action on statute-of-limitations grounds id
determined by the law of the State in which the federal court sits.”).
80
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (“[J]udicial proceedings … shall have the same full faith and
credit in every court within the United States … as they have by law or usage in
courts of such State … from which they are taken.”); Marrese v. Amer. Acad. of
Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985).
81
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 499.
82
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 500.
83
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 41(b).
84
See Michael J. Edney, Preclusive Abstention: Issue Preclusion and
Jurisdictional Dismissals After Ruhrgas, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 193, 205 (2001)
(“Rule 41(b) directly addresses the preclusive effect of a dismissal before a full
trial on the merits ….”); Patrick Woolley, The Sources of Federal Preclusion Law
After Semtek, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 527, 577 (2003) (“It is not surprising that [Rule
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unfortunate practice, begun in Ragan, of reading a Federal Rule to
mean something different in diversity cases than in federal question
cases. Rule 41(b), said the Court, does not speak to claim preclusion
at all. Rather, it merely bars the plaintiff from re-filing the case in the
same court.85 The Court’s stated reason for this absurd reading of
Rule 41(b) was the fear that the Rule as written was too substantive.
That is, the Court suggested that the natural reading of the Rule
might run afoul of the REA because it would modify or abridge the
substantive right to bring the claim.86
Having disposed of Rule 41(b), the Court was left with an
unguided Erie choice: should it deem this matter substantive and
apply state law or procedural and governed by some federal law?
The twin aims of Erie favored applying state law.87 Moreover, the
Court had just suggested that the preclusion question was “too
substantive” to be covered by the Federal Rules. Nonetheless, the
Court insisted, with virtually no explanation, that federal law must
control the preclusive effects of diversity judgments. The only stated
reason for this insistence was concern for the federal courts’ ability
to use dismissal of a case as a sanction.88 What if, posited the Court,
a state did not recognize such a dismissal as preclusive? As discussed
below, this concern was a red herring.89 For the Court, however, it
was the sole justification for declaring that the Court itself had
inherent power over a matter it had just deemed too substantive for a
Federal Rule.
In a final twist, the Court reverted to Erie principles to decide
what the federal common law rule should be.90 Rather than choose a
uniform rule of federal law, the Court held that federal common law
41] was the only Federal Rule that was understood to expressly address preclusion
prior to Semtek.”).
85
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 505.
86
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 506.
87
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508.
88
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508.
89
See infra, text accompanying notes 163-66.
90
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508-09 (“[A]ny other rule would produce the sort of ‘forumshopping … and … inequitable administration of the laws’ that Erie seeks to
avoid.”) (quoting Hanna).
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would adopt the rule of the forum state unless, on a case-by-case
basis, there was an important federal reason to choose a different
rule.91
3. Shady Grove v. Allstate
The most recent installment of the Third Phase is Shady Grove
v. Allstate.92 At issue in Shady Grove was another New York tort
reform statute. This one prohibits class actions to recover
“penalties,” such as statutory interest.93 The New York statute
conflicts with the ordinary understanding of Rule 23, which sets the
conditions under which class actions are appropriate in federal
court.94
Allstate, seeking to avoid a $500,000 class action when the lead
plaintiff would only be entitled to $500, argued that Rule 23 should
be read more finely.95 The Supreme Court decision was splintered.
Justice Ginsberg, writing for the four dissenters, followed the path of
Ragan, agreeing with Allstate that Rule 23 should be read to come
into play only if the substantive law itself authorized class actions.96
Justice Ginsburg did not pretend that this reading of Rule 23 was
natural. Rather, she argued that courts should consciously read the
Rule to avoid conflict with the state’s substantive policy goals: they
should “interpret the Federal Rules in light of a State’s regulatory
policy.”97
The plurality, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, rejected this
argument that an individual state’s policy should influence the
interpretation of federal law.98 Justice Scalia wrote that Rule 23
91

Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508-09.
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Insur. Co., _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 1431
(2010).
93
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1436 (discussing N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. § 901).
94
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1435; see Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23.
95
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1437.
96
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1468 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
97
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1468-69 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
98
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1440-41.
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should be given its natural meaning as long as that meaning “really
regulates procedure” and is thus valid under the REA.99 His plurality
maintained that as long as a Rule “really regulates procedure” in a
general sense, it trumps any conflicting state law, regardless of
whether the state enacted the law for substantive policy purposes
rather than procedural ones.100 Justice Stevens, the fifth vote for
rejecting the application of state law in Shady Grove itself, wrote
separately to hold out the possibility that a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure could be invalid as applied in a rare case.101 A Rule that,
in general, “really regulates procedure” might create such a
disruption in state substantive policy that it would be invalid for
abridging, enlarging, or modifying a substantive right.102 However,
Justice Stevens concluded that Shady Grovewas not such a case, so
he voted not to apply the state law.103
The split in Shady Grove highlights an important debate over
how to determine the validity of Federal Rules. The current test is
that a Rule is valid if it “really regulates procedure.”104 This generous
standard comes from subpart (a) of the REA, which authorizes
regulation of “practice and procedure and rules of evidence.”105
Academics have long bemoaned the Supreme Court’s neglect of
subpart (b), which many interpret as an independent limit on the
Rules.106 That is, even a Rule that “really regulates procedure” might
be invalid if it also “abridge[s], enlarage[s], or modif[ies] any
99

Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1442.
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1444-45.
101
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1451 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
102
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1453-54 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
103
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
104
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1445.
105
28 U.S.C. § 2072(a).
106
See, e.g., Ely, supra note 1, at 719-20; Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive
Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47,
48 (1998) (collecting citations); but see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling
Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1108 (1982) (arguing that § 2072(b) does
not have independent effect distinct from the effect of § 2072(a)).
100
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substantive right.”107 Shady Grove exposed a split between those
who would apply subpart (b) on a case-by-case, “retail” basis and
those who would determine the validity of Federal Rules strictly at
the “wholesale” level.108 Justice Scalia’s plurality in Shady Grove
took the “wholesale” approach. Rule 23 was evaluated on its own
terms and was found to be targeted at the regulation of procedure.109
While the plurality inquired in a general sense whether the Rule
regulated substantive matters, it did so without reference to the
particular state law at issue.110 The dissent, and to a lesser extent
Justice Stevens, would determine the validity of the Federal Rule, as
applied, with reference to the state law.111 If the state law is
understood to serve substantive aims but uses a procedural
mechanism to achieve them, the Federal Rule may have to give
way.112 For example, John Hart Ely explained that whether a state
prohibition on court-ordered medical exams applied in federal court
would depend on the reason for the state ban.113 If the ban was part
of a general scheme of limited discovery, it would be deemed
procedural and thus trumped by the federal practice.114 If, however,
the state enacted the ban as substantive protection for the right to
personal privacy, federal courts would have to honor it in diversity
cases.115 In Shady Grove, the dissent argued that the state’s
restriction on class actions served the substantive goal of limiting
107

28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
In addition to the Shady Grove opinions, compare Ely, supra note 1, at 733-34
(advocating case-by-case determination of whether a state’s interest in its laws is
substantive or procedural) with Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 727 (“The
cautionary example of what has happened in the related field of conflicts of laws,
where case-by-case balancing of interests has threatened to destabilize the entire
field, should lead the Supreme Court to reinforce rather than retreat from a uniform
interpretation of general rules of procedure.”).
109
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1444.
110
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1444.
111
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 1451 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
112
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 1452 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
113
Ely, supra note 1 at 733-34 (using the facts of Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. 1 (1941)).
114
Ely, supra note 1 at 734.
115
Ely, supra note 1 at 734.
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liability under penalty clauses and was thus inapplicable in the
particular circumstances of the case, even if Rule 23 is generally
valid as a regulation of procedure.116
The retail side of the wholesale/retail debate is the first step
toward the ad hoc, discretionary approach that characterizes Phase
Three. In Shady Grove, the dissent would have adopted an ad hoc
interpretation of Rule 23 designed to accommodate a particular state
law. This form of accommodation is a step away from Gasperini and
Semtek, in which the Court created its own procedures that combined
elements of state and federal law. The degree of judicial discretion is
greater in the latter two cases, but the willingness to strain federal
law is the same and is still in keeping with Phase Three.
II. WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE THIRD WAY
Gasperini and Semtek have been extensively analyzed and criticized,
and the same fate surely awaits Shady Grove. With the third installment,
however, we can now see the pattern of discretionary shifting between
substance and procedure that earns these cases the designation of Phase
Three of Erie. As this pattern threatens to become entrenched, it is worth
considering the Court’s rationale and authority for the new approach. Part
II.B, below, argues that the Court lacks authority for exercising the
discretion that characterizes Phase Three. Part II.C refutes the primary
theoretical justification for that discretion: While the Court has adopted a
pose of vindicating federalism by accommodating state policies, the Phase
Three approach is neither required nor even necessarily helpful for
protecting the results of democratic processes in the states.
A. The Chorus of Criticism
Erie’s Third Phase has been criticized from several quarters for being
confusing and for failing to give adequate guidance to the lower courts.117
116

Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1468 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See Thomas D. Rowe, Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think
the Supreme Court is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna
Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 963-66 (1998) (summarizing
criticism of Gasperini); Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 708 (describing a
117
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Kevin Claremont, for example, offers mild praise for the Shady Grove
plurality for bringing greater clarity to Erie doctrine while backing off
from what I am calling the Phase Three approach.118 The most common
specific complaint about Semtek and the Shady Grove dissent is their
return to the practice of creating dual readings for Federal Rules: Semtek
and the Shady Grove dissent both accepted strained, implausible
interpretations of Federal Rules to be used only in diversity cases, with the
more natural interpretation continuing to prevail in federal question
cases.119 The creative textualism of Semtek’s Rule 41 and the Shady Grove
dissent’s Rule 23 is perhaps to be admired as a matter of lawyerly
semantic skill, but it should not be embraced by courts.120
Commentators have also noted that the ad hoc approach of the
Third Phase is in tension with Erie itself. Earl Dudley and George
Rutherglen observe that “federal district courts today arguably
possess greater freedom to reach desired results in diversity cases
than they had under Swift v. Tyson.”121 Douglas Floyd similarly
complains that Gasperini’s open-ended interest balancing will lead to

“chorus of academic criticism” for Gasperini and Semtek); see also Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Has the Erie Doctrine Been Repealed by Congress?, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1629, 1635 (2008) (calling Gasperini “pitiful”).
118
Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, SSRN (2010).
119
See, e.g., Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 708-09 (summarizing the
authors’ criticisms of Gasperini and Semtek); J. Benjamin King, Clarification and
Disruption: The Effect of Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. on the Erie
Doctrine, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 161, 164 (1997) (arguing that Gasperini
undermines reliance on apparently applicable Federal Rules).
120
One reason for rejecting such unnatural readings in order to reach a result in a
particular case is that potential for unforeseen consequences in other cases is
substantial. For example, the Shady Grove dissent would separate the “substantive”
question of whether class remedies are available on a particular cause of action
from the “procedural” questions addressed by Rule 23. While perhaps a clever
resolution of the case before it, such a holding would have opened the door to
litigation over whether class remedies are “available” as to every cause of action,
effectively creating a whole new field of law. See comment by Edward A. Hartnett
on civil procedure professors’ listserv, 3/31/10 (on file with author).
121
Dudley-Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 744-45. Interestingly, the lower courts do
not seem as interested in exercising this freedom as does the Supreme Court. See
infra, Part III.A.
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“unwarranted subordination of substantive state objectives to ad hoc
judicial perceptions of amorphous federal procedural ‘interests.’”122
Other commentators have praised both Gasperini and Semtek.
Stephen Burbank claims responsibility for most of Semtek, although he
parts ways with the Court over its dual reading of Rule 41(b).123 Praise for
Gasperini has come from those, like Thomas Rowe and Richard Freer,
who applaud the effort to accommodate state law and to give independent,
retail-level meaning to part (b) of the REA.124 Professor Freer, however, is
critical of the Court’s application Erie’s twin aims,125 and Professor
Rowe’s praise was in part contingent on the Court’s continued production
of solid majority opinions, a record that was broken by the splintered
decision in Shady Grove.126
This Article joins with the critics of the discretion exercised by the
Supreme Court in Gasperini and the dissent in Shady Grove. It adds, in
part II.B.1, that Semtek is of the same mold and, in part II.C, that
democracy in the states may actually be better served by abandoning the
Phase Three approach.

122

C. Douglas Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment on Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc., 1997 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 267, 269-70. Floyd also argues that
Gasperini should have either applied state law at both the trial and appellate or
applied federal law at both levels. The latter argument, however, appears to
overlook the Seventh Amendment aspect of Gasperini.
123
Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1038, 1039-47 (2002).
124
Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 1637 (1998); Rowe, supra note 117. Professor Rowe supports allowing
states to override Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on substantive policy grounds,
arguing that such overrides will be rare and could always be trumped by Congress.
125
Freer, supra note 124, at 1654-57.
126
Rowe, supra note 117, at 1014-15. Shady Grove also dashed Rowe’s hope that
the Gasperini dissenters were driven primarily by Seventh Amendment concerns
and would join the rest of the Court’s deferential interpretive approach in future
cases.
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B. The Supreme Court Exceeds Its Authority When It Freelances on
Erie Questions
This section argues that the Supreme Court’s freelancing on choiceof-law questions exceeds its authority under the Constitution, the REA,
and the RDA. In Semtek, the Court announced its creation of federal
common law to govern the preclusive effect of federal diversity
judgments, refusing to apply either Rule 41 or state law. Under the terms
of Semtek itself, the Court’s authority for creating common law was
suspect, and the Court offered no justification for its claim of power. In
Gasperini, the Court presented itself as creatively seeking an
accommodation of its own devising between state and federal law,
effectively creating a federal common law of New York remedies. This,
too, the Court failed to justify. In both cases, the Court lacked authority for
the freelancing that characterizes the Third Phase.
1. The Trouble With Semtek: The Court’s Inherent Powers
Cannot Logically Exceed the Power of the Court and
Congress Acting Together.
Semtek’s reasoning is worse than circular; it is more like a
mobius strip. The question presented starts out as a seemingly
procedural one regarding the effect of Federal Rule 41(b).127 But no,
says the Court, the question is substantive and therefore not
reachable by the Federal Rules.128 Turn the page again, however, and
it is once again procedural—at least, procedural enough to be subject
to the inherent powers of the federal courts.129 This chain of
reasoning constitutes a wrongful arrogation of power. If preclusion is
“too substantive” to be regulated by the Supreme Court and Congress
acting together through the REA, then the courts lack authority to
regulate it pursuant to their inherent power to regulate procedure.

127

Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501 (2001).
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-04.
129
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508.
128
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The usual rule is that the preclusive effect of a judgment is
governed by the law of the court that rendered the judgment.130 This
rule allows the parties to make reasonable predictions of potential
preclusive effects and to behave accordingly; it also vindicates the
procedural interests of the forum, which uses future preclusive
effects as tools for controlling the parties’ behavior over the course
of the litigation.131 Because the source of the law that will govern
future preclusive effects should be ascertainable at the time the first
judgment is rendered, we can imagine that every judgment contains
an invisible footnote specifying the preclusion law that applies. A
California judgment, for example, will contain an invisible footnote
summarizing California preclusion law. When that judgment is
presented as a defense to litigation in a Maryland court, the Maryland
court applies the decisions embodied in the judgment and the
California rules of preclusion to the allegations made in the
Maryland action. From these elements, it determines whether the
Maryland action is precluded. The question in Semtek was: When a
federal court in California sits in diversity, does the invisible
footnote to its judgment contain California preclusion law or federal
preclusion law?
As described above, the defendant in Semtek first argued that
federal law controlled because Rule 41(b) made the California
judgment preclusive.132 According to the first part of the opinion,
however, the Court adopted a convoluted reading of Rule 41(b)
because preclusion was dangerously substantive, even for REA
purposes.133 The Court warned that reading Rule 41(b) to govern
preclusive effect “would arguably violate the jurisdictional limitation
of the Rules Enabling Act: that the Rules ‘shall not abridge, enlarge
or modify any substantive right.’”134 This argument suggests that the
130

See Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945,
1002 (1998). Courts sometimes apply the preclusion law of the law-supplying
jurisdiction from the first case. Id. Either way, preclusive effects are predictable,
since they do not depend on the law of the enforcing jurisdiction.
131
See Erichson, supra note 130, at 1002-03.
132
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 501.
133
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-04.
134
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 1026 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §2072(b)).
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preclusion question in Semtek falls on the substance side of the
spectrum, indicated here by the star:

substance

REA test

Erie/RDA test

procedure

Semtek thus argues, as a justification for its narrow reading of
Rule 41(b), that preclusion is “too substantive” for the REA.135
According to our diagram, even the possibility of being “too
substantive” for the REA should mean that preclusion is substantive
for Erie purposes as well. Under the RDA, the federal courts would
therefore be required to follow state law. The invisible footnote of a
diversity judgment would contain state law, and the preclusive effect
of the judgment of a federal court sitting in diversity would be
governed by the preclusion law of the state that provided the
substantive law.
And indeed, the Court initially suggested that this outcome
would be required, for it stated that applying the federal Rule would
“in many cases violate the federalism principles of Erie ….”136
Citing Hanna, Guaranty Trust, and Walker v. Armco Steel,137 the
Court argued that giving force to the federal rule would result in
substantial variation in outcomes between state and federal court,
leading to the inequities and forum shopping that the “twin aims” test
is meant to prevent.138 So far, preclusion is clearly substantive for
Erie purposes, and substantive enough for REA purposes that a Rule
135

One could read Semtek as addressing not preclusion generally but preclusive
effect in the context of statute of limitations dismissals. This reading is discussed
infra, text accompanying note part III.B, as an option for limiting Semtek’s effect,
but it is not the most natural reading of the opinion, which speaks as if to questions
of preclusion generally.
136
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 504.
137
446 U.S. 740 (1980).
138
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 504.
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treading the ground of preclusion should be drained of life. This
analysis ought to mean that the federal courts are required by the
RDA to follow state law.
In the second half of Semtek, however, the Court reversed
course, deciding that the preclusive effect of diversity judgments
would instead be governed by federal common law.139 As support,
the Court cited cases suggesting that federal law controlled the
preclusive effect of federal judgments, but it conflated federal
question cases with diversity cases and conflated the obligation to
give full faith and credit to federal judgments with the determination
of what such faith required.140 The Court also relied heavily on a preREA case that it had already said no longer controlled.141 The
justification for making federal common law takes up barely more
than a page in the United States Reports, and nowhere does it
identify the source of the Court’s authority.142
Commentators have suggested that Semtek was based on the
Supreme Court’s inherent authority to govern procedural matters in
the federal courts.143 Although the Court is generally obliged to
follow congressional commands even in the realm of procedure, it is
usually thought to be free to develop rules of practice and procedure,
in the absence of congressional action or a governing Rule.144 Its
139

Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507-08.
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507 (citing cases).
141
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507-08 (discussing Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 130 (1874)).
142
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507-09.
143
See Woolley, supra note 84, at 537 (“While the court did not identify the source
of authority for a federal common law of preclusion, it would appear that statutes
creating the federal courts and bestowing jurisdiction upon them provide an
adequate basis—albeit and implicit one—for the development of common law
rules in this area.”).
144
Joseph J. Anclien, Broader Is Better: The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts,
64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L., 37, 41 (2008) (describing the predominant view
that inherent powers exist only in “cases of indispensable necessity” and arguing
for a broader view); Robert J. Pushaw, The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and
the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 743 (2001) (“As the early
Justices recognized but the modern Court has forgotten, the Necessary and Proper
140

HENDRICKS, ENDING ERIE’S THIRD PHASE

29

authority to do so comes either from Article III’s establishment of
the judicial branch or from Congress’s creation of lower courts and
conferral of jurisdiction to decide cases.145 The problem with relying
on this inherent power to explain Semtek is that before turning to the
inherent power, the Semtek Court had deemed the matter at issue to
be substantive.146 Of course, the location of the substance—
procedure line may vary according to the legal context, and we have
already said that it is different for the REA than for the RDA. The
line could certainly lie in yet another location for purposes of
inherent power. However, if preclusion is substantive for REA and
RDA purposes, but procedural for inherent power purposes, then
Semtek requires us to place a third arrow even further to the left,
marking the limit of the “procedure” category when the Court’s
inherent power is at stake. With the star still indicating the location
of preclusion law, we have the following:

substance

inherent

REA test

Erie/RDA test

procedure

power
(claimed)
This scheme seems quite unlikely. The Supreme Court has already
interpreted the REA to permit any rule that “really regulates
procedure.”147 This generous standard reflects the reality that
Congress’s blessing in the REA enhances the Court’s inherent
power. Just as in the Steel Seizure Cases,148 the powers belonging to
Clause authorizes Congress alone to determine whether or not to bestow beneficial
powers.”).
145
Barrett, supra note 14 (discussing the implications of these two lines of
authority).
146
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-04.
147
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Insur. Co., _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 1431,
1444 (2010) (adhering to this standard).
148
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Swayer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
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one branch of government are at their strongest when that branch
acts in concert with another branch.149 It makes no sense to say that
the Court’s inherent power to make procedural law exceeds its power
to do the same when buttressed by congressional authority.150 As
Elizabeth Lear has explained,
The Rules Enabling Act and the Rules of Decision Act are
… relevant to the scope of the Court's inherent power,
representing efforts by Congress to minimize friction
between the federal courts and Congress, and the federal
courts and the States, respectively. Together they form the
outer limits of judicial innovation on the procedural front.
… While Congress may enact substantive or procedural
statutes that displace the substantive law of the States, the
Rules of Decision Act prohibits the Court from doing so
under the guise of the inherent power.151
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that
he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”).
149
Cf. Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CAL. L. REV. 595, 598-99 (2008)
(“Federal common law could be analogized to Justice Jackson’s discussion of
presidential authority in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. Jackson’s
opinion explains the basic interaction between Congress and a branch with largely
derivative constitutional authority. I suggest that those dynamics work similarly
whether one considers Congress and the President (Youngstown), or Congress and
the Judiciary (federal common law).”).
150
Cf. Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non
Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 1147,
1184 (2006) (“[I]t would be very odd indeed if the Court could evade this
restriction simply by relying on its inherent power…. The Rules of Decision Act
represents the congressional vision of the appropriate balance between state law
and inherent power lawmaking by the federal courts.”).
151
Lear, supra note 150, at 1180-81; see also Wendy Collins Perdue, The Sources
and Scope of Federal Procedural Common Law: Some Reflections on Erie and
Gasperini, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 751, 760 (1998) (“The Rules Enabling Act may
constrain courts, even where they are not directly interpreting a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure but are instead creating a federal common law rule of “practice
and procedure. As Professors Westen and Lehman argue, “the statutory prohibition
on rules that abridge ‘substantive rights' must be deemed to apply to judge-made
rules too; otherwise, judges could do through common law adjudication what they
cannot do through the carefully circumscribed and safeguarded mechanisms used
to create the federal rule of civil procedure.”).
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For these reasons, the “inherent power” mark should, at a minimum,
lie somewhere to the right of the REA mark. Because preclusion is
substantive for RDA purposes, either the Federal Rule validly applies
and controls, or else state law controls. Depending on whether the
Semtek Court was correct in the first half of its opinion (calling
preclusion substantive, for both REA and RDA purposes) or the
second half (treating it as procedural), either the Court wrongly
usurped the states’ substantive power or it lawlessly ignored, through
convoluted interpretation, its own prior promulgation of Rule 41(b).
There are two defenses that one could make of the Court’s
analysis in Semtek, but each ultimately fails. First, perhaps my
diagram is misleadingly linear. The relationships among the RDA,
the REA, and inherent power may be multidimensional. There might
then be a way to justify the Court’s use of inherent power along a
different axis. Second, perhaps preclusion truly is substantive:
Semtek is justified not by the Court’s inherent power over procedure
but by substantive power to make federal common law.
The first defense would draw on the long-neglected part (b) of
§ 2072, which prohibits a Federal Rule from abridging, enlarging, or
modifying a substantive right.152 Commentators have long
complained that the Court’s “really regulates procedure” test for
validity under the REA implements only § 2072(a), authorizing the
Court to promulgate rules of practice and procedure.153 Many believe
that some further constraint is needed in order to fulfill § 2072(b)’s
command not to alter substantive rights.154 Preclusion is a classic
example of a body of law that is “procedural” in a sense but can also
reasonably be understood to alter substantive rights.155 It might then

152

28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
See, e.g., Ely, supra note 1, at 719-20; Kelleher, supra note 106, at 48
(collecting citations);.
154
But see Stephen B. Burbank, supra note 106, at 1108 (arguing that § 2072(b)
does not have independent effect distinct from the effect of § 2072(a)).
155
See Barrett, supra note 14, at 830-31 (treating preclusion as a matter of
procedural common law but noting that its “status as ‘procedural’ is … open to
doubt”).
153
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validly lie within the Court’s inherent power over procedure while
still being “too substantive” for the REA.
The problem with this first defense of Semtek is the RDA.
Surely, if preclusion law alters substantive rights, it is substantive not
just under the REA but also under Erie/Hanna/RDA. The RDA thus
directs the federal courts to apply state law. The Semtek decision
offers no justification for why state law does not “apply,” and thus
control, under the terms of the RDA. Analogy to Justice Jackson’s
Steel Seizure framework is again useful here156: While the Court’s
power over procedure is at its maximum when it acts in conjunction
with Congress, as under the REA, the Court’s power is minimal
when it acts contrary to congressional command.157 The adoption of
federal common law contrary to Congress’s policy of following state
law can be justified under the inherent power only to protect the core
ability of the federal courts to perform their judicial function.158 That
is a heavy burden, which the Semtek Court did not even attempt to
meet.
Similarly, any legal rule that would be deemed “procedural” for
Erie purposes is also sufficiently procedural to be within the scope of
the REA. Our diagram is thus correct in showing a linear,
progressive transition from substance to procedure, with the REA
and RDA tests marking different points along that line.159 The test
for inherent powers over procedure can, at most, be no further to the
left than the REA mark, and it is not possible for a matter to be “too
156

See supra, note 149 (discussing Steel Seizure).
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President takes measures incompatible with
the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then
he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter.”).
158
See supra, part II.B.1 (discussing the scope of inherent power relative to power
under the REA).
159
This discussion assumes that a Federal Rule is either valid or invalid under the
REA, ignoring the possibility that a Rule might be generally valid but invalid as
applied to displace a particular state practice that serves substantive goals. See
infra part II.C. (discussing reasons why Rules should not be invalidated as
applied).

157
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substantive” for the REA yet within the scope of inherent power. The
first defense therefore fails.
The second defense is that preclusion is, indeed, substantive,
and that the authority claimed in Semtek was not the inherent power
over procedure but common law-making power such as the Court
exercises over maritime law or suits to which the United States is a
party.160 In order to make federal common law, however, the Court is
supposed to identify some federal interest that is at stake.161 There
are only two federal interests that are conceivably at stake in the
preclusive effect of a diversity judgment: First, there is an interest in
ensuring that federal judgments receive full faith and credit. That
interest, however, does not speak to the content of the preclusion
rules that apply to the judgment, only to their being followed.
Second, there is a federal interest in the conduct of the initial
litigation, which will be affected by the anticipated preclusive effects
of the judgment.162 That, however, is a procedural interest, and to
justify federal common law on that basis without invoking the federal
courts’ power to regulate their own proceedings would be too fine a
cut.
The Semtek Court did describe one situation in which such a
federal procedural interest would exist and would require a federal
rule to control preclusive effect.163 That one situation was the
possibility that a state’s courts might not give preclusive effect to
dismissal as a sanction.164 This policy would conflict with a federal
court’s interest in making its sanction stick. The Semtek Court
160

See Barrett, supra note 14, at 831-32 (“In Semtek, the Supreme Court hinted
that its power to formulate federal rules of preclusion rests on the same ground as
its power to formulate substantive common law: the lack of congressional guidance
in an area of clearly federal concern.”). However, Barrett also points out that the
Court did not elaborate on this justification in Semtek and that its other preclusion
cases have been silent on the source of power. Id. at 832.
161
See Barrett, supra note 14, at 832 (identifying the grounds for judicial power to
formulate substantive common law).
162
Erichson, supra note 130, at 1002-03 (discussing the forum’s interest in the the
preclusion rules that would later be applied to a judgment).
163
Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001).
164
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 509.
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seemed to fear that, having intimated that preclusion was substantive
under the REA and flat-out stated that it was substantive under Erie,
it would be forced to live with the whims of states that impose only
ineffective sanctions on misbehaving litigants. This example is an
unconvincing basis for replacing state preclusion law with federal
common law if preclusion is, indeed, properly understood as
substantive for REA and RDA purposes. State courts, like federal
courts, prefer their sanctions to be meaningful, so it seems unlikely
that a state would adopt such a self-defeating policy as the Semtek
Court imagined. Moreover, there is no need to contort either
preclusion law or Erie doctrine to deal with that slight possibility. A
federal court certainly has the power to deprive a misbehaving party
of property as a sanction, whether that property takes the form of
cash or a cause of action.165 That hardly means that that we need a
federal common law of property. Moreover, Byrd already permits
case-by-case balancing of state and federal interests, so that a matter
that would otherwise be controlled by state law can be federalized
because of compelling federal concerns in a particular situation.166 If
the Supreme Court truly believes that preclusion is an otherwise
substantive matter, the dismissal-as-sanction example at best
warrants federal common law only as an exception, not as the
general rule.
The outcome reached in Semtek has intuitive appeal: preclusion
has a substantive feel, especially in the context of a statute-oflimitations dismissal, yet an equally strong intuition says that federal
courts must retain control over the enforcement of their judgments.
As discussed below, these concerns could be addressed without the
free-wheeling approach to judicial authority on display in Semtek.167
The Supreme Court cannot shake off the yoke of the REA by hinting
that a matter is substantive while simultaneously claiming inherent
procedural authority to regulate the matter on its own.
165

See Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 52 (1991) (holding that Erie did not
prevent a federal court from using its inherent power to sanction a litigant, even
where the state court might not have imposed a similar sanction).
166
See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (allowing
courts to balance Erie concerns against countervailing federal interests).
167
See infra, part II.C.
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2. The Trouble With Gasperini: The RDA Does Not
Authorize a Body of Federal Common Law.
Other than the Supreme Court’s inherent power over procedure,
there is only one possible source of authority for making a federal
common law of preclusion for diversity cases. It is also the only
possible source of authority for making a federal common law of
New York tort damages in Gasperini. That source is the RDA itself.
The point of Erie, however, was that neither the RDA nor any other
provision of federal law authorizes federal courts to create general
common law.168 To the extent that the Gasperini Court perceived
itself as creatively accommodating state law to the requirements of
federal constitutional procedure, it reached beyond its authority, as it
did in Semtek.
Congress’s grant of diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts
could, in theory, be understood to include a grant of lawmaking
power.169 In the course of hearing common law claims, the federal
courts would make the law to apply to those claims. However, the
RDA, as interpreted in Erie, rejects that approach.170 Rather than
authorizing federal courts to make substantive law, it directs them to
take the applicable state law as they find it.
In Gasperini, the Court seemed to think it was trapped between the
RDA’s command that it follow the state’s substantive policy and the
Seventh Amendment’s demand to respect the jury’s verdict. Of course, in
a conflict between a state statute and the Constitution, it is clear which one
prevails. Nonetheless, the Court felt the force of Erie policy to be so
strong that it sought out a resolution that would enforce state policy
without offending the Seventh Amendment, perhaps distorting its Seventh

168

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REV. 881, 915-16 (1986) (noting this possibility and its rejection in Erie);
Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U.
L. REV. 585, 623 (2006) (noting that Semtek involved federal common lawmaking
based solely on the existence of diversity jurisdiction).
170
See Field, supra note 169, at 915-16.
169
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Amendment analysis to get there.171 The RDA, however, says that the
federal courts should follow state law, where it applies, not that they
should devise new laws in order to serve the policy goals they believe to
have been articulated by the states. The Court’s freelancing in Gasperini
took it exactly where Erie meant it should not go: rather than simply apply
state law, the Court had to discern what policies New York legislators
meant to pursue, balance those state policies with federal interests, and
devise a practice that the Court believed would appropriately
accommodate those interests.
Like in Semtek, in Gasperini the Court took upon itself the
authority to formulate the law that would apply to a diversity case. In
Semtek, the Court appears to have done so on the basis of its inherent
powers. As shown in Part II.A., however, inherent powers were
inapplicable in light of the Court’s rationale for rejecting the
applicability of Rule 41(b). In Gasperini, the Court did not offer
even a hint of its authority for developing policy to accommodate
state interests, rather than simply applying (or not applying) state
law. The RDA rejects such a role for the federal courts. In both
Semtek and Gasperini, the Court’s rhetoric of discretionary
formulation of policy by federal courts is beyond its legitimate scope
of inquiry.
C. The REA and the Scope of State Legislative Authority
When the Court exceeded its authority in Semtek and Gasperini,
it did so with the best of intentions. The Court seemed to see itself as
serving the goals of Erie and the RDA by accommodating state law,
yet retaining federal supremacy where necessary. In this Part, I argue
that the Court’s good intentions toward the states were misplaced. Its
efforts to forge creative compromises between state and federal
practices greatly magnify judicial discretion, which is contrary to
both the federalism and the separation of powers aspects of Erie and
the REA. Moreover, the Court’s justification for increasing its own
171

See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 629 (2000)
(sharply criticizing Gasperini’s treatment of the Seventh Amendment, calling it
“aberrant” and not worthy of deference as a matter of stare decisis).
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discretion—greater accommodation of state law—is flawed.
Paradoxically, federalism and respect for state authority over
substantive law could be equally well served by a wholesale
approach that adheres to valid federal Rules regardless of the states’
idiosyncratic use of procedure to serve substantive goals. This is so
because a uniformly applied set of Federal Rules would put state
lawmakers on notice of the procedures to be used in diversity cases
and allow them to formulate their substantive law accordingly. This
approach would have the beneficial effect of increasing democratic
transparency in the states.
1.

Echoes of the First Two Phases

The Court’s choice-of-law decisions in Phase Three echo some
of the themes from Phases One and Two, and are thus subject to the
same critiques. While Phase Two had its excesses, its conceptual
framework was sound; part of the problem with Phase Three is the
re-introduction of mistakes from Phase One. Following the lead of
the Shady Grove plurality, the Court should abandon these mistakes
and return to a moderated version of Phase Two.
Before Hanna, the Supreme Court inaugurated the practice of
adopting implausibly narrow readings of Federal Rules in order to
apply state law instead.172 This practice has returned in Phase
Three.173 The practice is especially pernicious when a more natural
reading of the Rule continues to be applied in federal question cases,
so that the same language in the same Rule means two different
things, depending on the basis for federal jurisdiction. Even Justice
Stevens’s “retail” approach in Shady Grove would be an
improvement, if it entailed frank acknowledgement that the Rule was
being found invalid as-applied, rather than disingenuously
distorted.174

172

See, e.g., Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
See supra, parts I.C.2 and I.C.3 (discussing Semtek and Shady Grove).
174
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Insur. Co., _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct.
1431, 1448 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
173
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This conceptual improvement, however, would not solve the
problem of excessive discretion by the federal courts. The retail
approach means having federal judges decide in every case whether a
state’s true motive for its law is substantive or procedural, a more
difficult task than the already-difficult one of classifying an actual
rule or law as such. Each case would also involve a Byrd-like
weighing of the strength of those state interests, as compared to any
federal interests at stake. In contrast, the approach of the Shady
Grove plurality could mark the end of Phase Three and a return to
the conceptual structure of Phase Two, although ideally with a less
aggressive approach to defining the sweep of Federal Rules. As
discussed below, this return would best be served by taking the
wholesale, rather than the retail, approach to the Rules themselves.
2.

Separating Substance and Procedure to Improve State
Lawmaking

While Phase Two may have gone too far, it was conceptually
the right approach, and the Shady Grove plurality is right about how
the validity of Rules should be evaluated. Many of the pros and cons
of the “wholesale” and “retail” approaches have been debated
elsewhere.175 Here, I focus on one argument for the “wholesale”
approach that has been neglected and that directly answers one of the
main concerns of those on the “retail” side.
A primary theoretical argument on the retail side is respect for
democratic enactments in the states. In this section, I show that
adhering to federal procedures can be beneficial to state-level
democracy, because it forces state lawmakers to make their policy
preferences clear through the substantive law, rather than masking
preferences through specialized procedure. This justification for
wholesale, rather than retail, federal procedure gains support from
the observations of several theorists who have, from a variety of
perspectives, analyzed the relationship between substance and
175

See Ely, supra note 1, at 733-34 (outlining and endorsing the retail approach);
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1440-47 (endorsing the wholesale approach and
criticizing the retail approach used by the dissent and concurrence).
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procedure in light of democratic norms.176 Moreover, at least in
recent years, this justification is consistent with congressional action
manifesting a desire to maintain the federal courts as a procedurally
independent forum for litigating state law claims.177
A wholesale approach to the Federal Rules has the potential to
improve state lawmaking by forcing state lawmakers to be more
open and transparent with respect to substantive goals. The fact that
state law claims will be adjudicated under federal procedures reduces
the ability of state lawmakers to say, with Representative Dingell,
““I’ll let you write the substance ... you let me write the procedure,
and I’ll screw you every time.”178 Dingell’s statement reflects the
fact that a substantive goal can easily be undermined by imposing
procedural hurdles. Substantive entitlements are visible to the public
when it assesses the government’s work, while procedural
mechanisms are more arcane, difficult to understand, and usually
trans-substantive. When lawmakers tinker with procedure on a
substance-specific basis, they often do so in order to modify
substantive rights de facto, even if the substantive right remains
formally unchanged.
Many will regard the lawmaker’s ability to fine-tune substantive
rights through procedural mechanisms as a good thing. Legislatures
retain ultimate control over many aspects of procedure in part
because of the close connection between substance and procedure.
Indeed, the notion of a dichotomy between the two categories is
relatively recent.179 Nonetheless, that dichotomy now lies at the root
of the litigation framework that has been created by Congress and
that is contemplated by diversity jurisdiction, the RDA as interpreted
176

See infra, text accompanying notes 182-206.
See infra, text accompanying notes 217-20.
178
Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327. Before the Subcomm. on
Admin. Law and Governmental Regulations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
98th Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. John Dingell).
179
Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U.
L. REV. 801, 804-10 (2010) (describing how the concept of substance and
procedure as a dichotomy emerged along with the convergence of law and equity
and coincided with the early development of courts in the United States).
177
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in Erie and its progeny, and the REA. Here, I argue only that
maintaining that dichotomy is not necessarily a usurpation of state
legislative prerogatives but instead can enhance the democratic
legitimacy of state substantive law. While substance and procedure
may be inextricably intertwined, there is still value in trying to
separate them.
Other commentators have argued that separating substance from
procedure can promote democratic values.180 Their analyses have
focused on concerns that some of the Federal Rules are “too
substantive” and thus improperly alter substantive rights under state
and federal law alike.181 This Article takes no position on where the
substance—procedure line should be drawn for purposes of the REA,
except that the line should be drawn wholesale rather than retail.
However, the democratic problems created by an over-reaching
judiciary that uses procedure improperly to affect substance are
similar in kind to that of a legislature that does the same. The same
theoretical points thus support the idea that adherence to the Federal
Rules in federal court is no insult to the democratic processes of the
states.
Martin Redish’s work contains the most explicit and extensive
discussion of the democratic implications of manipulating procedure
in order to affect substance in the context of purely federal law.182
Redish argues that a legislature has a duty to be forthright about the
substantive rights it enacts into law. As part of that duty, the

180

See infra, text accompanying notes 182-96, 200-06 (discussing work by Martin
Redish and JoEllen Lind).
181
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty:
Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. L.
F. 71 (hereinafter Redish, Class Actions); Lind, supra note 25.
182
See Redish, Class Actions, supra note 181; Martin H. Redish & Christopher R.
Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of Powers, and the Democratic
Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United States v. Klein, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 437 (2006) (hereinafter Redish & Pudelski, Legislative Deception); Martin H.
Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives,
46 MERCER L. REV. 697 (1995) (hereinafter Redish, Federal Judicial
Independence).
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legislature cannot create opaque procedural requirements that in
effect undermine the rights proclaimed by the substantive law:
For example, in formally adopting “standard A” as a
general rule of decision, while simultaneously requiring the
federal courts to reach decisions that effectively amount to
adoption of “standard B” or “standard ‘not A,”’ Congress
has substantially subverted the representational democratic
process.183
Redish argues that this sort of legislative deception could violate
both the procedural due process rights of litigants and the separation
of powers.184
An example where procedural rights might be violated is
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Deborah Brake and Joanna
Grossman have demonstrated that the remedial scheme established
under Title VII is so burdensome on claimants, so unforgiving about
its short deadlines, and so poorly designed as a response to the reallife experience of discrimination, that Congress has failed to protect
the substantive rights purportedly created by Title VII.185 While
Congress may not have been under a duty to create those substantive
rights, it claims to have created them and reaps the political benefit
of having done so. If it has encumbered those substantive rights with
such a defective enforcement mechanism that they effectively do not
exist for a substantial portion of people, then perhaps, under Redish’s
theory, Congress has violated the due process clause by purporting to
create a substantive right but then making it overly burdensome to
vindicate that right.
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Redish, Federal Judicial Independence, supra note 182, at 715-16.
Redish, Federal Judicial Independence, supra note 182, at 716.
185
Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a RightsClaiming System, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 859 (2008). That Brake & Grossman’s thesis is
an example of Redish’s point is pointed out in Howard M. Wasserman,
Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. 1547, 1557-58 (2008).
184
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Separation of powers is a more salient concern when Congress
forces the courts to employ Orwellian double-speak. Redish, with
Christopher Pudelski, argues that the Supreme Court implicitly
recognized this problem in United States v. Klein.186 Klein involved
the ability of southerners to reclaim property lost during the Civil
War.187 To prevail, a claimant had to have remained loyal to the
United States.188 The Supreme Court had held that receipt of a
presidential pardon constituted proof of loyalty.189 Congress had
sought to reverse that presumption, declaring that a pardon should
instead be taken as proof of disloyalty.190 In Klein, the Supreme
Court struck down the presumption, but the precise reason for doing
so is not clear from the opinion. The statute drew into question not
only the independence of the judiciary in determining the evidentiary
significance of a particular fact but also the scope of the president’s
pardon power.191 Redish and Pudelski make a convincing argument
that concerns about legislative deception were part of the mix.192
Redish has argued that the same concerns should have led to a
different outcome in Michael H. v. Gerald G., in which the Supreme
Court upheld California’s marital presumption of paternity, rejecting
the parental claims of the genetic father in favor of the mother’s
husband.193 Having promised the public that “loyal” southerners
would reclaim their property and that “fathers” would have legal
rights as parents, the legislature could not require the courts to make
a mockery of language by following presumptions that forced the
opposite conclusions. Redish argues, “Under separation-of-powers
principles, this congressional action is defective, because it
effectively enlists the federal judiciary in a scheme to bring about
voter confusion.”194
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Redish’s argument is a difficult one where the deceptive
procedural requirement is created by the same legislature that has
power over the substantive law. Even opaque procedural statutes are
public and open to inspection. And lawyers, at least, are accustomed
to the occasional counter-intuitive presumption or definition. If
“substance” and “procedure” are merely labels that attach to
conclusions, why not “father” and “loyal”? Moreover, in each of
Redish’s examples, the legislative presumption is reasonably
defensible. Pardons are usually granted to people who have, in fact,
done something wrong, and an admission of guilt is sometimes
required. Congress may have been justifiably outraged that pardons
were being used to deem people “loyal” for purposes of its
compensation scheme. Similarly, marriage to a child’s mother has
historically been the crux of legal and social of fatherhood.195 The
marital presumption in Michael H. could be mocked only because of
fairly recent technology allowing for the identification of a genetic
father. It is difficult to know when a legislative presumption would
become so absurd that it would violate the separation of powers to
force the courts to speak in the legislature’s terms.
Redish acknowledges that it would be difficult to say when a
procedural statute goes so far in deceiving the public about the
substantive content of the law that a court should strike it down.196
For purposes of my claim, however, that line need not be drawn. I do
not suggest that state laws be struck down as unconstitutional for
intermingling substance and procedure. Rather, I argue that federal
courts should recognize that adhering to a uniform system of federal
procedure can benefit democratic process in the states, even when
displacing state procedure affects substantive outcomes. Protecting
195

Nancy E. Dowd, From Genes, Marriage and Money to Nurture: Redefining
Fatherhood, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 132, 132 (2003) (“Largely in the name of
gender equality and to some extent in the name of children’s rights, we have
moved from a legal definition of fatherhood linked to marriage towards a legal
definition of fatherhood linked to genes.”).
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Redish& Pudelski, Legislative Deception, supra note 182, at 457-58 (describing
five difficult questions about the model of legislative deception, including “[I]f it is
conceded that all procedural and evidentiary rules may in some sense impact the
substantive rights being enforced, why disapprove of such a connection only in
certain contexts?”).
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procedure from the legislature prevents lawmakers from engaging in
the sort of deception that Redish criticizes.
In a similar vein, Linda Mullenix has argued that maintaining
independent procedures Is necessary for a well-functioning
independent judiciary.197 Her focus was on Congress’s increasingly
frequent interventions in federal procedure in the last thirty years.198
Mullenix decries the resulting politicization of federal procedure as it
is created through legislative rather than judicial institutions.199 The
same phenomenon can occur at the state level. If it does, state courts,
drawing on either Redish’s or Mullenix’s ideas, might decide that
their prerogatives have been invaded and strike down excessive
legislative interference with procedure as a matter of state separation
of powers. Even without such drastic action, however, the existence
of federal diversity jurisdiction can check the ability of state
legislators to manipulate substance through procedure.
Redish’s theory described above is concerned with legislators
using procedure to subvert substance. Redish and others have also
expressed concern about judges doing the same thing.200 JoEllen
Lind terms this phenomenon “procedural Swift” and accuses the
federal courts, jointly with Congress, of manipulating procedure to
undermine state substantive law.201 Redish has also argued that
courts wrongly use procedure to transform substantive law.202
Interestingly, Lind and Redish both point to class action procedure as
a prime example, but with opposite perspectives. Lind argues that the
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Linda M. Mullenix, Judicial Power and the REA, 46 MERCER L. REV. 733, 734
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Class Action Fairness Act of 2005203 and stringent federal standards
for certification permit defendants to remove to federal court and
thereby avoid legitimate enforcement of state law through class
mechanisms.204 Congress, she argues, should not “use complex
litigation to hide law reform that could not gain public approval if its
consequences were better known.”205 Redish, in contrast, argues that
the judicial invention and liberalization of class actions to make
certain claims feasible that would not otherwise be brought is an
illegitimate departure from legislative expectations.206
This difference between Lind and Redish on class actions is a
matter of baselines. As David Shapiro has pointed out, the
availability or non-availability of class actions affects enforcement of
substantive law, but this fact does not tell us what the default rule
should be.207 More generally, Thomas Main argues that substantive
law is always premised on the procedural system that legislators
assume will be used to enforce it.208 Any change in procedures will
affect the balance of deterrence contemplated when the law was
enacted.209 Main concludes with two proposed solutions to the
problem of “mismatch” between procedures when a court applies
foreign law: first, when a court applies foreign law, it should apply as
much of foreign law, both substantive and procedural, as possible;
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second, at the policy level, we should strive to harmonize procedure
across jurisdictions.210
In the domestic choice-of-law context in federal courts, both
administrative and theoretical considerations favor Main’s second
solution over his first. Administratively, federal courts should not be
required to adopt large chunks of the procedural devices of the fifty
states, as Erie doctrine and the REA have long recognized.
Moreover, procedure changes over time, and fidelity to Main’s goal
of fulfilling legislative expectations would require courts to discover
and apply the procedures that existed at the time each substantive
rule was adopted. Theoretically, as discussed above, uniform
procedure requires legislatures to pursue their substantive goals more
transparently.
In addition, Main’s claim that changes in procedure wrongly
interfere with legislative expectations rests heavily on a deterrence
theory of lawmaking.211 While some or most lawmakers may operate
from that perspective, the public may expect the substantive law to
mean what it says in every case, not just as a matter of probabilities
and enforcement rates. Only people who have been through at least
one year of law school are likely to be comfortable answering the
question “Isn’t that illegal?” with “Yes, but nothing is meant to be
done about it.”
The approach advocated here puts some burden on state
lawmakers to be familiar with judicial procedures and perhaps even
to amend substantive law occasionally to keep pace with evolving
procedural law. As long as we are satisfied that “procedural law,” as
embodied in the Federal Rules and in the courts’ use of inherent
authority, is sufficiently procedural, this is not too much to ask of
legislators. Congress unquestionably has the power to determine
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Main, supra note 179 at 838-40. Main also advises courts to be humble and
skeptical about their ability to apply foreign law. Id. at 838.
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achieve a particular level of deterrence).
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federal procedure and to confer diversity jurisdiction.212 By
following uniform, trans-substantive procedure, the federal courts
may deprive state lawmakers of the ability to modify their own
substantive creations through substance-specific procedures.
Democratic theory suggests that this result may not be a bad thing.
Consider the contrary assumption that has animated the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Phase Three. In Gasperini, the
Court seemed almost to feel guilty about the existence of the Seventh
Amendment as a constraint on federal courts.213 It reasoned as if state
legislators enact their laws in a state-only bubble and the entire
burden of figuring out how to carry out their wishes in diversity
cases must fall on the federal courts. State legislators, however,
should be assumed to be aware of diversity jurisdiction, and there is
nothing wrong with expecting them to take it into account. If
Congress had considered a statute similar to the New York law at
issue in Gasperini, the Seventh Amendment would surely have been
a topic of discussion; New York legislators should have had the same
conversation.
Consider also the state laws at issue in Shady Grove. The
substantive law proclaimed that insurance companies would be liable
for a 2% penalty if they failed to pay claims in a timely fashion.214
Perhaps, when this law was enacted, legislators and insurers alike
knew full well that it would almost never be enforced in individual
actions, since the cost of litigation would almost always outweigh
the potential recovery.215 The procedural innovations of class actions
changed that, leading to far more efficient enforcement of the
substantive right proclaimed on the face of the statute. Now, perhaps,
as a matter of regulatory policy, this outcome over-deters: it makes
212
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insurance companies rush their payments too much, or it imposes
liability out of proportion to their moral culpability, or it makes too
many campaign contributors unhappy. If that is so, it is time to
change the substantive law, not keep the same law—promising
ordinary citizens that they are protected by this penalty—but disable
the courts from enforcing it. If the legislature says that insurance
companies should pay 2% penalties, courts are entitled to assume
that the legislature actually wants this to happen. They should adopt
procedures that achieve this result in as “just, speedy, and
inexpensive” a fashion as possible.216 Separating substance from
procedure, artificial as it may be in some senses, has the virtue of
requiring the legislature to speak as clearly as possible in the
substantive law.
This separation of substance and procedure is also consistent
with congressional action from the REA to the present. Although
Congress initially recognized the importance of state substantive law
by enacting the RDA, it has regularly expressed a preference for
independent federal procedure.217 That preference has become so
pronounced in a recent years that it prompted Geoffrey Hazard to
ask, “Has the Erie doctrine been repealed by Congress?”218 Hazard
argues that the judicial system envisioned by Congress is best
described as follows:
State law is the substantive basis of the American legal
system, displaced only selectively by federal substantive
law. The federal court system, however, provides the
premier American model of the judiciary and, as such, is
called upon to administer its form of justice in legal
disputes.219
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In statutes like the Class Action Fairness Act, Congress has
expressed its view that, “in certain types of cases, the judicious
administration of state law is better entrusted to federal courts.”220
The dichotomy between substance and procedure may be
artificial and thus difficult to define and maintain. It is nonetheless a
dichotomy that Congress has placed at the foundation of the federal
judicial system and that serves important functions in that system. In
Erie’s Third Phase, a plurality of the Supreme Court has begun to
break down that dichotomy, apparently in the name of state
democratic processes. State-level democracy, however, does not
need this solicitude. Just as the courts are frequently at pains to
ascertain and apply state substantive law, state lawmakers can
reasonably be expected to ascertain federal procedural law, and to
plan accordingly. If they do so, uniform federal procedure will not
stand in the way of their substantive goals. Moreover, state law
would gain in democratic legitimacy and transparency because
lawmakers would be prevented from manipulating procedure in ways
that undermine the apparent goals of substantive law.
III. ENDING PHASE THREE
Phase Three of Erie is characterized by discretionary lawmaking
for which the federal courts lack authority. It is undertaken for the
seemingly self-effacing purpose of accommodating state policies. As
it turns out, however, state-level lawmaking would likely fare just as
well or better in the face of uniform federal procedure. Fortunately,
Phase Three is so far strictly a Supreme Court phenomenon, and the
decisions in Gasperini and Semtek can and should be contained. This
section sketches a plan for construing those cases narrowly and
bringing an end to Phase Three of Erie.
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A. The Third Phase Has No Traction in the Lower Courts
Lower federal courts have routinely cited Gasperini and Semtek
as the Supreme Court’s most recent articulation of Erie principles.
The lower courts have not, however, emulated the Supreme Court’s
Phase Three approach by creating their own accommodations of state
policy. Instead, they have continued to give “yes” or “no” answers to
Erie questions. Phase Three can therefore be contained, as a Supreme
Court frolic that has not yet taken root in general federal practice.
Lower courts are presumably more sensitive than the Supreme
Court to the dangers of inviting litigants not only to argue for or
against the application of state law but also to suggest novel
accommodations of the interests embodied in each. Perhaps for this
reason, I have found only one lower court decision that even
considered following the Phase Three strategy. In Houben v. Telular,
the Seventh Circuit reviewed the leading Erie cases in detail and then
commented, “It seems possible to us, in light of the substantive
policy … and in keeping with Gasperini’s approach, that state
substantive interests and federal procedural rules might be capable of
accommodation.”221 After a short discussion of that possibility,
however, the court concluded that the accommodation was “too
much of a strain” and decided not to apply state law at all.222 This
reluctance to follow the Gasperini path bodes well for ending the
Third Phase before it takes hold beyond the Supreme Court.
B. Containing Semtek
In Semtek, the Supreme Court may have had a legitimate reason
for creating federal common law based on its inherent power over
procedure in the federal courts. The Court, however, was neither
honest nor logical about how it got there. The best way of limiting its
effect in the future is to confine its holding to the particular
circumstances of the case—the preclusive effect of a dismissal on
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statute-of-limitations grounds—rather than to construe it as a general
statement about preclusion.
The most serious problem with Semtek was its suggestion that
preclusion is, as a general matter, a substantive realm that is beyond
the reach of the REA.223 Other Federal Rules regulate matters that
bear on preclusion, such as permissive and compulsory joinder.224 If
read to deal generally with preclusion, Semtek calls into question the
validity of those Rules.225 Instead, Semtek should be construed as
primarily a statute of limitations case, rather than a preclusion case.
At the next opportunity, the Court should clarify that matters such as
joinder are well within the scope of the REA, including the
preclusive effects of failing to join a compulsory claim.
While this approach is, admittedly, not the best reading of the
Semtek decision, it is at least plausible. Patrick Woolley has already
shown how to “save” federal preclusion rules from Semtek using the
back door that the Court left open for ensuring the preclusive effect
of dismissal as a sanction.226 Recall Semtek’s holding: the preclusive
effect of a diversity judgment is governed by federal common law; to
determine the content of that federal common law, courts should
borrow from the preclusion law of the forum state, unless federal
interests demand a different rule.227 The stated reason for the final
caveat was the remote possibility of a state failing to accord
preclusive effect to dismissals that sanction a party.228 Woolley,
however, points out that strong federal interests are also at stake in a
variety of other aspects of the preclusion analysis, such as joinder,
whether claims are compulsory, and when a judgment becomes
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final.229 Again, all of these federal interests are procedural interest,
properly governed through the REA and/or the inherent powers of
the courts. In Woolley’s assessment, only statutes of limitations and
questions of privity fail to trigger sufficient federal interests to
warrant uniform federal treatment.230
This re-reading of Semtek remains possible because the Semtek
Court did not firmly commit itself to the position that Rule 41(b)
would be invalid if construed to have preclusive effect.231 Its
suggestion of that possibility should be read in the context of a
statute of limitations analysis. Statutes of limitation have a unique
place in Erie jurisprudence. It was a statute of limitations that first
drove the Court, in Guaranty Trust, to try to articulate a test for
when state law controlled in a diversity case.232 Once established,
federal respect for state statutes of limitations contributed to the
229
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excess of the First Phase when the Court in Ragan adopted a dual
reading of Rule 3 in order to bring state tolling rules into federal
court.233 Semtek should be seen as part of this pattern rather than as
establishing a general rule for preclusion questions.
Under this approach, Semtek becomes the exception to a general
rule that the preclusive effect of a federal judgment is a matter of
federal procedural law. Rules of preclusion “really regulate
procedure” and are thus properly addressed in the Federal Rules.
However, a few aspects of preclusion law—statutes of limitations,
perhaps privity—are sufficiently substantive to warrant restrained
interpretation of the Rules, and are substantive for Erie purposes, so
that state law applies if the Federal Rules do not. Importantly, the
conclusion that these issues are substantive is a wholesale, not a
retail, determination. One can say that “joinder” is properly deemed
procedural and governed by the law of the court that hears the case,
while “privity” or “statutes of limitations” are best governed by the
law-supplying state without inquiring into what laws any particular
state has adopted in these matters.234
233

Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
The one major problem not addressed by this reading of Semtek is that even the
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In the alternative, the Court could adhere to the view suggested
in Semtek that preclusion is, in general, too substantive even under
the REA. The problem with Semtek, of course, is that the Supreme
Court adhered to that view only for the first half of the opinion. To
be consistent, the Court should have refrained from claiming
inherent power over a matter it had already cast as too substantive
for the REA. The Court therefore should have held that it was bound
to follow state preclusion law not by federal common law of its own
creation but by the RDA. While I believe it would be preferable to
recognize most questions of preclusion as procedural for REA
purposes,235 what is untenable is for the Court to claim inherent
procedural power while at the same time declaring the matter beyond
the reach of the REA.
C. Containing Gasperini
The flaws in Gasperini are easier to confine to the
circumstances of that case. The Gasperini Court wrongly approached
the case as if it could formulate, not merely apply or not apply, New
York law. More specifically, the Court indulged two errors in its
approach. First, the Gasperini Court forgot the original point of Erie:
that state common law rules are, like state statutes, “laws” under the
RDA. Second, faced with what it deemed a substantive New York
law in conflict with the federal Constitution, the Court should have
used ordinary severability analysis (rather than its own discretionary
balancing of state and federal interests) to determine what law to
apply.
First, the description of Gasperini in Part I.C.1, above, follows
the Court and most commentators in describing the issue as whether
the New York statute on appellate review of damages applied in
federal court. The Supreme Court felt the statute was sufficiently
235
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substantive to warrant application under Erie, but also that it
conflicted with the Seventh Amendment obligations of the federal
courts. To read the body of the Court’s opinion, the Syllabus, and
many other synopses of the holding, one would think that the
Supreme Court itself came up with the compromise of
accommodating state policy by having the trial court, rather than the
appellate court, perform the damages review.236
The problem with this description is that not one but two New
York laws were relevant in Gasperini. The first was the statute,
which required damages review by appellate courts.237 Second, as
the Court briefly acknowledged in its background section but then
ignored for the rest of the opinion, the common law of New York
required damages review by trial courts under the same standard. 238
Erie says that both the statute and the common law are “laws.” 239
While the New York statute conflicted with the Seventh Amendment
and therefore could not apply in federal court, the common law did
not conflict with the Seventh Amendment and could therefore
apply.240 There was no need for creativity, accommodation, or other
interest-balancing by the Supreme Court.
Unfortunately, the Gasperini Court ignored the state’s common
law rule and treated only the statute as “law” that might apply in
federal court. 241 This raises the question: what if the common law
236
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rule had been different? That is, New York must have some legal
standard for when a trial court can revise a jury verdict. If that
standard had happened to differ from the standard prescribed by
statute for appellate courts, the Supreme Court’s freelancing on how
to “accommodate” the statute would have ended up paradoxically
displacing another state law. Gasperini did not call for the Supreme
Court to make up a federal common law of New York damages
because New York already had a common law of damages.
Second, in formulating its own accommodation of the statute, the
Supreme Court was so wrapped up in creative Erie analysis that it ignored
the ordinary task of a court faced with a law that is constitutional in part.
Once the Court determined that the New York statute represented a
substantive policy choice under Erie, the next step was to apply the
statute. Faced with a Seventh Amendment barrier, it should have done just
what a New York court would have done, if the Seventh Amendment had
the same effect in state court: asked if the statute was entirely
unconstitutional or if some part of it could be saved by a severability
analysis. The severability analysis—under New York severability rules, of
course—may well have yielded the resolution that the Court reached on its
own. Whether it did or not, the decision would have been better because
reached by the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation rather than the
Court’s own creative process. The correct question was not “What kind of
accommodation can we make between state and federal interests?” but
“What would a New York court do, faced with this statute and a
constitutional barrier to applying it in full?”
An approach that focused on statutory interpretation would also be
superior because it would have a better chance of revealing the actual
legislative intent, which is likely to bear on the initial classification of the
law as substantive or procedural. When legislatures enact tort reform
measures that implicate procedure, there is nothing wrong with expecting
them to know that state tort cases are litigated in both state and federal
courts. New laws must therefore be consistent with federal requirements
for there to be a chance that they will be fully enforced. Thus, there was
no reason for the Supreme Court to feel guilty, as it seemed to feel, about
the inconvenient fact of the Seventh Amendment. Moreover, if the Court
had conceptualized the problem as one of statutory interpretation, it would
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have realized that New York’s highest court would never be presented
with this particular problem, making certification of the question
appropriate.
In contrast to the Court’s dual interpretations of Federal Rules in Erie
cases like Ragan and Semtek, there is nothing incongruous about the New
York statute producing different results in state and federal cases. That
difference is a function not of the substance/procedure distinction but of
the Seventh Amendment’s status as one of a very few unincorporated
rights.242 The New York legislature can anticipate the operation of the
federal Constitution in federal court just as well as it can anticipate the
operation of the state constitution in state court. Although the statute was
apparently consistent with New York constitutional requirements, there is
nothing wrong with expecting New York legislators to anticipate the
Seventh Amendment problems as well. If those legislators believed they
were enacting substantive policy that would apply in federal court, they
should have accommodated federal constitutional constraints. On the other
hand, a severability analysis grounded in legislative intent might have
uncovered that the legislature’s concern was with excessive or widely
varying verdicts in local trials presided over by local, elected judges.
There may have been little concern about federal juries under federal
judges. Since the Supreme Court saw the statute itself as sounding in both
substance and procedure, it would be worth asking at this point whether
the legislature’s goal was to change the substantive law applied in all
courts or to correct for procedural biases in the state court system.243

242

Most provisions of the first eight amendments to the federal Constitution are
incorporated against the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The restrictions on appellate review of jury verdicts that were at issue
in Gasperini are among the few exceptions. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Court
Says No to “Incorporation Rebound,” 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 818, 831-32 (2009)
(reviewing the state of incorporation at that time).
243
Here, I am taking as given the Gasperini Court’s conclusion that the New York
law at issue was substantive for RDA purposes and that no Federal Rule applied;
the Seventh Amendment is the only federal law in play. In the course of attempting
to apply a state law conceded to be substantive, it is of course appropriate to
consider legislative intent. Doing so does not conflict with taking a wholesale
approach to the validity of the Federal Rules.
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It is unfortunate that the Court approached Gasperini as if its
task were to create a federal common law of New York tort damages.
The Court likely would have reached the same result by respecting
New York common law as much as it respected the New York
statute, or even by performing a severability analysis, but it would
have kept the lines of authority clear. State substantive policy should
be implemented through state law, properly interpreted, not by
unauthorized federal common law.
CONCLUSION
Semtek and Gasperini each resulted in the unnecessary and
unwarranted exercise of federal judicial discretion rather than a
straightforward choice between state and federal law. However, the
Supreme Court’s creative energy on Erie questions has not yet
infected the lower courts, and both Semtek and Gasperini can still be
confined to their fairly narrow circumstances. The split in Shady
Grove indicates that the Supreme Court remains poised between two
paths: either ending Phase Three and returning to the conceptual
structure of Phase Two, or else continuing with Phase Three’s
pattern of idiosyncratic accommodation of idiosyncratic state
policies. This Article has shown that the Phase Three approach is
both improper and unnecessary on its own terms. The Supreme Court
is authorized neither to create a federal common law of state tort
policy, as it appeared to do in Gasperini, nor to use its inherent
power over procedure to circumvent the REA, as it appeared to do in
Semtek. Moreover, the Court’s decisions in Phase Three appear to be
motivated largely by a sense that special accommodations are
necessary to protect substantive state policy interests, the very
interests that Erie itself vindicated. This motivation is misplaced.
Case-by-case modification of federal procedural law is not necessary
to protect state’s democratically chosen policies. Rather, uniform
federal procedure will allow states to formulate substantive policy
with knowledge of the procedures through which they will be
enforced and will encourage state lawmakers to act openly through
the substantive law rather than manipulate outcomes with special
procedures. Shady Grove should therefore mark the end of Erie’s
Third Phase.

